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Mutual-to-Stock Conversions and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board
Three actions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
within the past year will help promote a momentous shift in the own-
ership structure of the many associations that comprise the federal sav-
ings and loan industry. The shift would be from mutual to guarantee
stock, a realignment transfering ownership of these institutions from
the current depositors to whomever purchases their stock.' The
FHLBB's actions, signaling a new national policy, consisted of: (1) en-
dorsing2 the administration's proposed Housing Institutions Moderni-
zation Act of 1971, 3 which would authorize the creation of federal
guarantee stock associations either by conversion or de novo; (2) allow-
ing the Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association, a federal mu-
tual association, to convert to a state stock association, ostensibly as a
1. The savings and loan industry is made up of a large number of associations that
specialize in making loans on real property and accepting relatively small deposits from
large numbers of depositors. The federal government and each of the states charter sav-
ings and loan associations. The federal government charters only mutual savings and
loan associations. A mutual association does not have any stockholders; the depositors
are considered to be the owners and they have the first claim on the association's sur-
plus. All states charter mutual savings and loan associations and twenty-one of them
also charter what are called guarantee stock associations. Guarantee stock associations
issue permanent capital stock and function like an ordinary corporation. No stock as.
sociations are chartered by the federal government. See T. MAtvELL, TuE Fa-EPAL Hossz
LOAN BANK BoARD (1969), for background on the industry.
The savings and loan industry is regulated primarily by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. The FHLBB employs its chartering authority to regulate federal associations.
Through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which insures the
deposits of almost all savings and loan associations, it regulates not only federal associa-
tions, but all large state ones as well. It reaches all federal associations, most state asso-
ciations and some other fiduciaries in yet another capacity-as a central banker for the
twelve district home loan banks. Although most state associations have FSLIC insurance
and are members of their district home loan bank they are in addition subject to what-
ever regulations the state which charters them imposes.
Savings and loan associations are not to be confused with mutual savings banks char-
tered by eighteen states, primarily on the eastern seaboard. Mutual savings banks are
trusteeships in which the board of trustees is elected bya slightly larger group of -elf-
perpetuating corporators. The trustees manage the banks for the beneficial owners, the
depositors. Deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
banks may join the Federal Reserve System. See W. WsLNG, MUtUaL S vL ;Cs BANKS
3-109 (1968).
Mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations are both distinguishable from
commercial banks, which have non-interest bearing demand deposits. Theoretically, de-
posits in the two common forms of savings institutions are time deposits, i.e., the in-
stitution may refuse to honor a withdrawal order until a specified period has passed.
See A. HART, MONEY, DEBT, AND ECONOsuic Acrivrry 39-42 (1953).
2. Hearings on SJ671 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-92 (1971).
3. S.1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.7809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs has held hearings on the
bill. The House bill was sent to the House Committee on Banking and Currency but
no hearings have been held. Neither committee has reported the bill.
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"test" to devise regulations for implementing the Housing Act;4 and
(3) announcing that in April of 1973 it will issue regulations permitting
federal mutual associations to convert to state stock associations, thus
ending a nine-year moratorium on such conversions.5
A shift in ownership structure occurring on a large scale would end
the mutual form in the federal savings and loan industry. The mutual
set-up is the historical norm, and its use was offered originally to justify
creating these specialized savings institutions. A mutual association is
"owned" in a loose sense by its depositors, since it accepts deposits or
issues withdrawable shares (sometimes called serial shares). 7 Whereas a
mutual association is analogous to a mutual benefit society8 a guarantee
stock association resembles a common stock corporation. The present
statute makes no provision for federally chartered stock associations,
but a federally-chartered mutual association may convert to a stock
association with a state charter under specified conditions.10
The mutual form's demise would mean the sacrifice of significant
advantages it has compared to the stock form. In the past, these ad-
vantages have not been fully realized. The responsibility for this
failure rests on the FHLBB, the industry's regulatory agency, which
has failed to protect depositors' interests. Now the FHLBB has become
a leading advocate of allowing industry-wide conversion from the
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1972, at 39, col. 3. The state stock association took the name
Citizens Savings and Loan Association, and will hereinafter be cited as Citizens.
5. N.Y. Times, Sep. 26, 1972, at 63, col. 4.
6. See T. MARVELL, supra note 1, at 6-7. Bankers have periodically campaigned for
the elimination of savings institutions. Bankers feel that savings Institutions are favored
by the tax laws and that banks would eliminate them if free competition were allowed.
A special commission dominated by bankers (called the Hunt Commission) did a study
for President Nixon in late 1971 and recommended substantial equalization between
banks and savings institutions. Robinson, The Hunt Commission Report: A Search for
Politically Feasible Solutions to the Problems of Financial Structure, 27 J. FINANCE 765
(1972).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 554.1 (1972).
8. Savings and loan associations are an outgrowth of what has been called the co-
operative movement that began with the English Friendly Societies in the nineteenth
century. Mutual savings banks and mutual insurance companies also trace their origins
to this movement. See W. WLFJLING, supra note 1, at 7.
9. Although in the past guarantee stock associations generally have been closely held,
the present conversion formula necessarily dictates that for the period immediately
following conversions the association's stock will be widely distributed. Herman, Conflicts
of Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry, in 2 STUDY OF TlE SAVINGS AND LOAN
INDusTRY 775 (.. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as STUDY].
10. The Home Owners' Loan Act establishes two ways for a federal association to
convert: (1) with FHLBB approval or (2) without FHLBB approval but in compliance
with all state regulations governing a state-to-federal conversion in that jurisdiction.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(i) (1970). The Act was passed before stock associations existed, so It
provides no special requirements for a stock conversion. The FHLBB has successfully
claimed that it may regulate and even halt these stock conversions under Its general
regulatory powers. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970). Guarantee stock associations are con.
centrated in Ohio, Illinois, Texas and California. See FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK BD.,
38TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1970 (1971).
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mutual to stock form. But notwithstanding the FHLBB's position,
Congress should prevent widespread conversion, and consider meas-
ures to insure effective regulation, so that the mutual form can be
made to work.
I. The Mutual-to-Stock Controversy
A. The Net Worth Distribution Issue
The most immediate consequence of a mutual-to-stock conversion
is the transfer of legal ownership of the association's net worth from
the depositors to the shareholders. Most of the controversy concern-
ing conversions has focused on this first consequence-the distribution
of net worth and the possibility that depositors' interests may not be
adequately protected. Some" have argued that depositors are entitled
to this net worth-in effect, the accumulation of past profits-on the
grounds that the depositors' deposits have generated the retained
earnings. The argument runs that it is feasible to divide the net worth
only among current depositors, in view of the difficulties of ferret-
ing out all past depositors and determining their pro rata shares of
the net worth.
Others have argued that distributing the net worth to depositors
is wrong, because the FSLIC, as the primary risk bearer, is entitled
to an association's net worth at the time of redistribution.1 - This ar-
gument seems mistaken: the FSLIC and the entire FHLBB are sup-
ported by profits of the savings and loan associations;13 the federal
government pays no money to support the FHLBB and bears the
risk of insuring accounts in only a remote way.14
It has also been argued; that the net worth of an association is
a community asset because the institution itself was originally designed
to serve a community purpose-financing home-building-and its net
worth is retained for purposes of solvency. This argument would
seem to favor application of the net worth to public interest projects
or distribution to the state, similar to the current practice of thrift
11. The FHLBB is the major proponent of this position. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.22-1 (1972).
12. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STrDY at 922.
13. T. MARvEL., supra note 1, at 223.
14. FHLBB bonds are not secured by the credit of the United States Government.
T. MA.vaLL, supra note 1, at 65. In an emergency, the FHLBB may borrow up to $750
million from the Treasury but presumably any borrowing would have to be repaid just
as the original loan setting up the FHLBB has been repaid. Id. at 30. See 12 US.C. §
1725(1) (1970).
15. NATIONAL AWs'N oF MUTUAL SAViNs BA,'us, ANNUAL Pm'xr 22 (1972).
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institutions in Europe.10 The profits of a savings and loan association,
however, seem no more a community asset than those of any other
savings institution, since they all use depositors' funds for similar
purposes; and there seems no reason for regarding profits from home-
building loans as community assets, while treating profits from other
kinds of investments as purely private gain.
The FHLBB has accepted the contention that depositors deserve
the association's net worth, and has acknowledged the need for safe-
guards to insure that each depositor receives the share of net worth to
which he is entitled. The FHLBB imposed the 1963 moratorium on
conversions' 7 after it concluded that depositors' interests could not
be adequately protected under then existing guidelines.1 8 The Board's
present regulations include two important requirements that would
apply if conversions were permitted to resume. First, a mutual asso-
ciation must give its members mailed notice of a conversion vote, and
second, the conversion must be approved by votes representing two-
thirds of the value of the association's deposits.' 9 In addition, if the
new state association is to issue guarantee stock, the conversion plan
must guarantee each shareholder (depositor) an amount equal to his
pro-rata share of the association's net worth.20 Finally, in the recent
Citizens conversion, 2' the Board imposed elaborate new safeguards
to ensure that depositors received their pro-rata share of the associa-
tion's net worth.
The Citizens safeguards were designed to: 22 (1) eliminate depositor
speculation by setting a record date for participation; (2) give the de-
positors an amount of stock reflecting the size of their deposits ac-
cording to an independent appraisal of stock worth; (3) use additional
stock to increase, not dilute, the capital of the association; (4) require
a two-thirds vote of approval by the depositors as a prerequisite to
conversion; and (5) prohibit payment of dividends on the stock for
16. W. WFLFLING, supra note 1, at 235-58.
17. Prior to 1963 an association could convert directly from the mutual to state stock
form. In that year the FHLBB imposed a moratorium on conversions. Decision #72-149,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1, Feb. 2, 1972 [hereinafter cited as FHLBB Decision].
18. The FHLBB doubted the stability of these associations. Later experience sub-
stantiated such doubts. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDY at 918-19.
19. 12 C.F.R. § 546.5 (1972).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 563.22-1 (1972).
21. The relevant portions of California law governing the conversion are CAL. FINAN.
CODE § 6463 (West 1968) (Ratification Procedure) and 10 CAL. ADMIN. CoDE § 205 (Dis-
closure Requirements).
22. These safeguards were originally formulated by the United States Savings and
Loan League at its annual meeting in 1970. See U.S. SAvNCS & LOAN LEAcuE, ANNALS
279 (1971). The League is the largest trade association of the savings and loan industry.
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the first five years after conversion.23 In addition, the FHLBB de-
manded the right to approve the date of fulfillment for sale and pur-
chase, the price, commissions and discounts, as well as the offering
circular and other conversion materials. Also, it insisted that Citizens
agree to enforce the terms of the plan24 in court and to allow no stock
options for five years.23
Although it is now apparent that Citizens' depositors in fact received
a pro-rata share of the association's net worth,20 the FHLBB's pro-
cedures failed to take account of two other risks inherent in large
scale conversions. The management of Citizens or any association could
have manipulated the net worth of the association over the years to
understate its value.27 Also, if a large number of conversions were
allowed, the FHLBB's procedures might have functioned far less strict-
ly or effectively. Success achieved in a single instance, under the glare
of publicity, offers no guarantee of protection in the future.
23. Id. at 279-89.
24. Depositors in the association as of March 20, 1970 were eligible to receive stock
pro rata based on their share of the net worth. One share of stock was issued for each
V250 of deposits, but no one received less than ten shares. A depositor with less than
$2500 in deposits had the option of selling his shares through a broker to another
bidder or buying enough shares to bring him up to ten, but not over 1.000. After
this offering the holders of ten or more shares had the option of selling all, selling
part, or buying an amount, but their total could not exceed 1,000. Next, individuals
who were borrower members or who became depositors after 3March 20 were entitled
to purchase up to 1,000 shares. See Citizens Savings and Loan Ass'n, Offering Circular,
March 8, 1972. The price on the stock was the lower of the net offering price (the
price set by the public sale of stock minus brokerage fees) and the maximum purchase
price (the price set by the association after consultation with one or two "major in-
vestment banking firms'). The depositors were determined to own 1,377,078 shares on
the record date and the association issued 250,000 new shares of stock. If the depositors
and borrowers had bought all the new stock there would not have been a public offering
and the depositors would have bought and sold shares at the maximum purchase price
because no offering price would have existed. If the net offering price had turned out
to be less than the maximum purchase price there would also have been no public
offering because no one would have wanted the stock at that price. The active man-
agement received 2,750 shares or less than ;Seo of the offering since by the terms of
the plan it could not make additional purchases. Plan for Converting Citizens Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n to Citizens Savings and Loan Ass'n, January 4, 1971, at 33-39.
25. FHLBB Decision, supra note 17, at 2.
26. On April 13, 1972 a consortium of brokerage houses offered the unwanted Citi-
zens stock on the open market at $3l.50 per share. The brokerages sold the 466,344
shares offered and the depositors received $28.50 per share. The depositors who sta)ed
in purchased 250,000 shares over their account value. Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1972, at 29,
col. 1.
27. An association may desire to overvalue property to increase the size of a loan
to a party or increase capital to avoid dividend or borrowing restrictions by the district
home loan bank. It may want to undervalue an asset to keep a borrower within the
one-borrower limit (10% of assets) or to decrease net worth prior to a conversion. All
of these types of juggling are hard to regulate because the IHLBB does not want its
associations to value a loan or property at its prevailing market price. In 1956 the
FHLBB issued a long policy statement on appraisals, attempting to establish criteria
in the area. 12 C.F.R. § 571.1 (1972). More recently, the FHLBB proposed a regulation
that the book value of the property should be regarded as market value at the time
of dosing. See 35 Fed. Reg. 6080 (1970).
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B. The Stock and Mutual Forms Compared
More fundamental than the question of how to distribute net worth
is the issue of which form is preferable, mutual or stock. From the
standpoint of management, five reasons are usually given in favor
of the stock form: 28 (1) stock associations generate larger amounts of
capital, which provide a cushion during periods of heavy withdrawals,
and more working capital for growth in ordinary times; (2) the stock
form makes management more accountable and reduces management
personnel turnover; (3) the stock form allows an association to op-
erate in holding company form; (4) executives can receive deferred
compensation via stock options, and thus develop a proprietory in-
terest in their association; and (5) stock associations are more profit-
able and grow more quickly.
These reasons are unpersuasive. Mutual associations already gen-
erate sufficient capital;2 9 in fact, most of them have excess capital. 0
During the 1966 money squeeze, stock associations tended to have
less money available to meet the liquidity crisis.81 Savings and loan
associations already have the right to issue subordinated debentures
(in effect, common stock)3 2 but none has taken advantage of this
right.33 It may be argued that subordinated debentures cannot be
marketed because the debenture holder will be last in line in case
of liquidation. But the stockholder's status is of no higher priority,
raising the question of why stock would be expected to sell and de-
28. This analysis is based on conversations with five savings and loan association
executives in Boston, New Haven and Cincinnati, who declined to be identified either
by name or by association.
29. Theoretically an established stock association could raise new capital by an of-
fering. But the Brigham and Pettit study indicates that "relatively little" new capital
has been raised in this fashion; most new capital has been generated by retention of
earnings. The study found nonetheless that it was easier to start up a stock association
than a mutual. Brigham & Pettit, Effects of Structure on Performance in The Savings
and Loan Industry, in 3 STUDY at 1166-68. To promote creation of new mutual banks,
a Central Industry Fund was established in 1961 using capital contributed by established
banks to start new banks. WELFLING, supra note 1, at 157. See also Klein, On Causes
and Consequences of Savings and Loan Deposit Rate Inflexibility, 27 J. FINANCE 79 (1972).
30. The existence of excess reserves at one particular time is not necessarily proof
that an association or group of associations is generating enough capital. However, the
fact that an excess of reserves has always been held by savings and loan associations Is
good evidence for that proposition. See FHLBB REPORT, supra note 10, at 16-17, 114-15.
Interestingly, the commercial banking industry has concluded that large capital re-
serves are undesirable. In fact, there has been a tendency during this century to
gradually diminish capital requirements. P. HAHN, THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF COM-
MERCIAL BANKS 203-04 (1966).
31. T. MARvEL, supra note 1, at 205-06.
32. Subordinated debentures are long-term debt securities that rest on the general
credit of the corporation and are subordinated to whatever debt is specified to be
senior in the subordination agreement. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORu'ORATIONS
1182, 1283-85 (unabr. 1969).
33. Hearings on S.1671, supra note 2, at 33.
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bentures would not. Moreover, some savings banks in the most com-
petitive market for savings (the Northeast) have successfully sold
such debentures. 34
As for accountability, all currently proposed conversion plans en-
vision wide public ownership of the stock, and management is likely
to be even less accountable under such arrangements. 35 The avail-
ability of the holding company form seems a questionable advantage.
Strong reservations have been expressed about its desirability"0 and
in 1967 Congress authorized more stringent investigation and regu-
lation of such holding companies. 37
In providing management incentives, stock ownership probably
would be no more effective than the current system, since executives
already may deposit over $150,000 in their associations through
various devices.38 Stock associations may enable deferred manage-
ment compensation but there is little support for the claim that in-
creased compensation would prevent discontinuity and turnover in
management. Available data suggests that mutual officers are com-
pensated at a slightly higher rate than stock officers.30 High turnover
of management personnel, if it exists, is due more likely to state
"branching" laws that prevent associations from growing and there-
fore limit opportunities for management personnel to advance.
Very little evidence supports the contention that stock associations
are more profitable and grow more quickly. Federal mutual associa-
tions are still growing in the most competitive markets.40 Indeed, the
FHLBB recently commissioned a report41 on profitability, and the
Chairman of the FHLBB told a congressional committee: "Now, I
34. Hearings on S.1671, supra note 2, at 241, 245. The FHLBB issued proposed regu-
lations in October which would control the issuance of these debentures. See 37 Fed.
Reg. 21178 (1972). In so doing, it announced that it hoped the issuance of such deben-
tures would help to provide the associations with needed capital. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
1972, at 59, col. 5.
35. See p. 562 supra. For a discussion of the accountability problem as view'ed
in the context of all mutually organized businesses, see Kreider, Who Owns the Mutuals?
Proposals for Reform of Membership Rights in Mutual Insurance and Banking Com-
panies, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 275 (1972).
36. For a detailed discussion of the effects of holding company ownership, see
Brigham 8: Pettit, supra note 29, in 3 STmo, at 1128-42. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 23289 (1972).
57. Act of February 14, 1968. 82 Stat. 6 (1967). See T. MARvEL., supra note 1, at 199.216.
38. In spite of FSLIC's limitation on the amount of insurance each individual may
have, the various rules governing joint accounts and trusts make it possible for a family
of three to deposit $150,000 and be fully insured. T. MARvELL, Supra note 1, at 110.
59. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDy at 897.
40. Comparative growth statistics on federal and state stock savings and loan asso-
ciations are unavailable. The yearly publication of the United States Savings and Loan
League suggests that the mutual associations are doing well in the states where the
stock form is most prevalent. See ANNAmS, supra note 22, at 221-23; U.S. SAVLCs A.ND
LOAN LEAGUE, ANNALS 247-49 (1972).
41. Brigham and Pettit, supra note 29, in 3 S=tDY at 971.
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think the committee will see that [the results of the study] . . . really
go to a great similarity in the operating results of these two kinds
of institutions."4 2
From the depositors' standpoint, the mutual form may well have
substantial advantages over the stock form. Designed as a democratic
alternative to the commercial savings bank, the mutual association
incorporated mechanisms of depositor control that theoretically made
it far more responsive to the needs of individuals with small amounts
of money to save or invest. Each individual was given at least one
vote in association matters, and none was allowed to wield more
than fifty votes.43 The charters of most associations limited borrowing
rights to depositors. Over the years, mutual associations have been
highly stable. Indeed, the FHLBB's recent study concluded that stock
associations have proven somewhat riskier than mutual associations,
without yielding any higher rate of return.44 The two forms have
not differed significantly in their record of profitability.45
The savings and loan industry has changed substantially from
the time of its founding, and the pious ideology of the mutual as-
sociations' founders may be unrealistic today.40 An institution like
Citizens, with 470,000 depositors, cannot be managed as an ideal "de-
positors' democracy." The number of depositors in such institutions
and the amount of money held in deposits is enormous and still
growing rapidly. 47 Even before this growth, many devices of the
theoretical depositors' democracy had atrophied.
The mutual form's advantages, however, might still be realizable
if the FHLBB were determined to make the mutual form work. A
pure depositors' democracy, as originally conceived, may no longer
be practical. But the devices of depositors' control, as well as the
mutual form's other features, might be revived to a significant degree
through appropriate regulatory intervention. The government's re-
sponsibility for regulation of the associations is already well-recog-
nized: it charters them, 48 grants them limited monopoly powers, 40
42. Hearings on S.1671, supra note 2, at 31.
43. See 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1972).
44. Brigham & Pettit, supra note 29, in 3 STUDY at 981-82.
45. Id. at 1182-86.
46. See H. ROSENTHAL, MANUAL FOR BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 33 (1888).
47. NATIONAL ASS'N OF MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS, FACT BOOK 45 (1971); FED. RESERVE
BULL. July, 1972, at A40.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970).
49. The federal government in effect gives associations limited monopoly power by
making it very difficult to start a new association or to open a branch office. One of
the stated considerations in ruling on an application is the present availability of
savings and loan services. This aspect of FHLBB policy is overseen by the "Office of
Industry Development." See FHLBB REPORT, supra note 10, at 79.
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and protects their rate of return through interest rate control and
special tax treatment.5 0 The industry's enormity has put it beyond
effective state control for some time. Indeed, many malfunctions
of the mutual form may be traced in large part to the FHLBB's
regulatory failures. And reviving the mutual form will depend di-
rectly on reorienting FHLBB regulation.
II. Reorienting the FHLBB
A. The Record of Regulatory Failure
The FHLBB's strong support for conversions indicates that it has al-
ready abandoned hope of reviving the mutual form. In testimony before
Congress, the most recent FHLBB Chairman argued strongly for
legislation that would move the entire industry toward adoption
of the stock form.51 The Board's treatment of the Citizens conversion
indicates that it will support other conversions in the future. And
if this particular "test" is any guide, the regulations to be issued in
April52 may be expected to encourage the trend.
The Board's failure to protect and update the mutual form is
shown by its record over the past twenty years. Consistently, it has
been more concerned with the interests of management than those
of depositors. It has: (1) allowed the mutual depositors' franchise
to atrophy; (2) discouraged depositors from asserting their rights by,
for example, supporting management's refusal to give depositors as-
sociation membership lists; (3) failed to move effectively against con-
flicts of interest; and (4) given officials elected by local industry
tremendous power in the supervisory system.
FHLBB policy has made the depositors' franchise, as defined in
the mandatory charters of the federal associations,53 a meaningless
provision. The FHLBB has refused to require that depositors re-
ceive an adequate annual report, and has never issued effective proxy
regulations. In addition, it has permitted management to organize
annual meetings in a way that stifles depositor participation.
Present regulations require only that an association print a vaguely
defined "statement of condition" yearly.54 The Board has declined
50. 12 US.C.A. § 461 (Supp. 1972); 26 U.S.C.A. § 593 (Supp. 1972). See also Levdlland
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 421 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1970).
51. See Hearings on S.1671, supra note 2, at 21-92.
52. The moratorium will not officially end until the FHLBB issues final conversion
regulations in April. N.Y. Times, Sep. 26, 1972, at 63, col. 4.
53. 12 C.F.R § 544.1 (1972).
54. 36 Fed. Reg. 25151 (1972).-
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thus far to adopt recently proposed revisions that would compel each
insured association to submit a detailed annual report to its de-
positors.rr Until 1971, the FHLBB allowed associations to use proxies
without any limitation on solicitation, scope, duration or revoca-
bility. This latitude, coupled with exemption from the Securities
Act of 1933 for withdrawable shares of regulated savings and loan
associations, gave management virtually untrammeled power 00 to
amass controlling blocks of undated irrevocable proxies and sell con-
trol of their associations to successor managements.T In the absence
of FHLBB action, courts attempted unsuccessfully to intervene. 8 The
regulations finally imposed by the Board in 1971 are still deficient
in a number of respects. They stipulate that all proxies must be
revocable and clearly labeled. No corporation may hold a proxy, and
no association may solicit an undated proxy or misrepresent a ma-
terial fact.59 But no limitation is placed on proxy duration and no
provision is made for disclosure of insider finances in proxy statements.
Annual and special meetings are theoretically the primary occasion
for the depositor to exercise his franchise, but under existing rules,
members need not be informed individually of the time or place
of an annual meeting or even that they are entitled to attend.0 The
mandatory by-laws of a federal association provide that notice to mem-
bers may be by mail or by publication in a newspaper of "general
circulation."061 No minimum number of members present and voting
is required for a quorum;32 consequently management does not even
have to collect proxies unless it fears a raid.03
The FHLBB's tendency to inhibit assertion of depositors' rights
is illustrated by its negative policy on depositor inspection of asso-
ciation membership lists. For years, the FHLBB rejected the notion
that a depositor had a common law right of inspection. 4 After two
federal courts established the right's existence,0 5 the FHLBB issued
55. 35 Fed. Reg. 12217 (1970).
56. 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.1, 544.6 (1972); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1970).
Publicly held state guarantee stock associations are regulated by the SEC in matters
pertaining to stock.
57. T. MARvau.L, supra note 1, at 14; Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDY at 798.800.
58. Pearson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 149 S.2d 891, 896 (1963).
59. 36 Fed. Reg. 19973 (1971).
60. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDY at 791.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 544.4 (1972).
62. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1972).
63. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDY at 794.
64. The Federal Home Loan Bank of Philadelphia declined to allow a depositor to
see a membership list and the depositor unsuccessfully sued to compel disclosure. Daurelle
v. Traders Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958).
65. In Durnin v. Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
the court held that in the absence of a federal regulation a common law right of access
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a "suggested" by-law on communications among members. The by-
law is optional, and allows an association adopting it to deny a mem-
ber access for any purpose that the association deems "improper."' '
The FHLBB's record on conflicts of interest is the most serious
evidence of its deference to management. Conflicts of interest stem
primarily from ancillary activities of officers and directors and con-
veyances of association control.07 A conflict may be direct, involving
an insider dealing with his association; or indirect, involving a deal
through an intermediary controlled by, or linked to, an insider.0 8
Regulations on direct conflicts are numerous but haphazardly en-
forced.69 Although the FHLBB requires a federal association, for
example, to guarantee "reasonable freedom of choice" in the pur-
chase of hazard insurance after a mortgage closing, 0 it rarely insists
on the rule.71 All of the direct conflicts now prohibited can be ac-
complished through a dummy. The idea of freedom of choice lacks
content, and the FHLBB's examiners do not have complete infor-
mation on the finances of insiders. More importantly, virtually no
regulations exist on indirect conflicts.
The FHLBB has recognized the inadequacy of its present regu-
lations on conflicts of interest. In fact, the FHLBB recently proposed
a more stringent set of regulations.72 But the Board retreated after
the suggested revisions stimulated an "unprecedented volume of public
comment."7 3
to the list existed under Pennsylvania law. In Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967) a federal common law right was recognized.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 544.6 (1972).
67. See Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STUDY at 764-69. The most common tie-in arrange-
ments are between associations and insurance agencies, law firms, real estate brokers,
building materials suppliers and land developers. Id. at 812.
68. Direct conflicts are more prevalent than indirect ones. Affiliated persons may
lease an office to an association at an inflated rental. An association's president on re-
tiring may convey his proxies to the new management and sell the association's building
or any other asset for its value plus a premium for control of the association. Id. at
799-801, 813-17.
69. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-5, 545.6-8, 545.6-18, & 545.10 (1972). See Goodman v. Per-
petual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1970).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 555.5 (1972). The FHLBB has recently allowed federal associations
to form service corporations which may sell insurance under certain circumstances. See
12 C.F.R. § 545.9-1 (1972).
71. Through the FSLIC, the FHLBB attempts to regulate conflicts of interest in in-
sured state associations. Consistent with the idea of **reasonable freedom of choice,"
the FHLBB forbids an insured association to condition a loan or service on the pur-
chase of materials or services from any specific supplier. 12 C.F.R. § 563.35 (1972). The
FHLBB has stated that the extant insurance regulations are not exhaustive; omission
does not connote approval. 12 C.F.R. § 571.7 (1972).
72. The proposed regulations generally forbid transactions with affiliated persons.
35 Fed. Reg. 12216 (1970).
73. Hearings on H.R. 5700 Before the House Comm. on Banhing and Currency, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. at 38-39 (1971). The FHLBB has revised these regulations to specify the
particular dealings an affiliated person may have with his association and to delegate
approval power on insider deals to the district supervisory agent. See 36 Fed. Reg.
7535 (1971).
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While avoiding the conflicts of interest problem, the FHLBB has
decentralized its supervisory system in a way that undermines the
independence of regulatory officials and discourages vigorous scru-
tiny.7 4 Examinations and audits are the principal means of FHLBB
supervision. In addition to submitting various reports, each associa-
tion must conduct an internal audit yearly and is subjected to periodic
surprise examinations. 75 Each federal home loan bank district has a
district supervisory agent responsible for reviewing all examinations
and audits, applications for new branch offices and all reports sub-
mitted by associations.7 6 Under the present FHLBB system, the agent
is also the president of the district home loan bank,7 7 and is elected
by the board of directors of the bank,7 two-thirds of whom are elected
by officials of the local industry.79 Almost inevitably, he is beholden
to the local industry for his job.
B. Regulatory Reform
In response to this record of regulatory failure, Congress might
consider revising the three basic statutes that created the FHLBB
and defined its duties 0 with the aim of improving depositors' affirma-
tive rights and building a regulatory structure that will be sympa-
thetic to depositors. The first step would be for the FHLBB to halt
conversions.
Depositors might be given greater voice in the associations by re-
quiring more frequent votes and distribution of more information.
To widen and secure the franchise, Congress might require each as-
sociation to obtain the approval of two-thirds of depositors attending
a meeting for any major association decision. The proxy regulations
recently adopted8' might be toughened to mandate fuller disclosure
of pertinent financial information.8 2 A depositor might be given a
statutory right to inspect membership lists and receive detailed an-
74. FHLBB REPORT, supra note 10, at 74-75. See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 556.5, 571.6 (1972).
75. 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.17-1, 563.18, 563.18-1 (1972).
76. FHLBB REPORT, supra note 10, at 74-75.
77. Bartell, Examination and Supervision, in 4 STUDY at 1739-40.
78. Id. at 1721.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1427 (1970).
80. They are the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 725 (1932), which
created the FHLBB to act as the central banker of the industry; the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) which gave the FHLBB power to charter federal
associations; and the National Housing Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1255 (1934) which created
FSLIC to insure accounts in state and federal savings and loan associations.
81. 36 Fed. Reg. 19973 (1971).
82. Herman, supra note 9, in 2 STuDY at 593.
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nual reports. Each savings institution and its officers might be made
amenable to derivative suits. s3
Additional measures might be considered to improve the integrity
and efficiency of regulation. Congress might impress on the FHLBB
its concern about conflicts of interest, for example, by specifically
directing the FHLBB to search for and extirpate such conflicts.8 4 As
a first step to ensure the independence of the supervisory apparatus,
it might make the district supervisory agent an appointive post.
The effectiveness of the FHLBB's regulations would be enhanced
if they applied to all mutual institutions-state-chartered mutual sav-
ings banks, as well as mutual associations. At present, the state-char-
tered mutual savings banks are subject only to the controls of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.sa Since these banks contain
over one-quarter of all the funds deposited in savings institutions,
they exert significant leverage on the policies of the entire industry.80
Bringing them under the FHLBB's control would increase the Board's
enforcement power s7 as well as add to its constituency a group of
banks and bankers who are committed to the mutual form.88
83. For a typical instance of the FHLBB's resistance to judicial intrusion, see Reich
v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964).
84. See p. 570 supra.
85. MAsv=., supra note 1, at 30.
86. An interesting example is the periodic pressure exerted on the FHLBB and
Congress to liberalize the portfolio rules for associations. The savings and loan asso-
ciations, in conjunction with the mutual savings banks, jointly sponsored a measure
(the proposed Federal Savings Association Act) which would have allowed savings and
loan associations to retain their present form but widen their portfolios to the extent
normally enjoyed by savings banks. The measure thus would have permitted their
portfolios to include corporate securities and unsecured personal loans. See Hearings
on H.R. 15, H.R. 10745, H.R. 11139 Before the House Subcomm. on Bank Supert,ision
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1967). Some congressmen have perceived that the associations have been able to dilute
FHLBB policies by citing the laxer controls applied to state chartered mutual saings
banks. In the last session of Congress, three bills were introduced dealing with the
problem of conflicts of interest in the savings and banking industries. See Hearings
on H.R. 5700, supra note 73, at 1-14. In testimony before the committee, the chairman
of the FHLBB declined to endorse any of the bills on the grounds that (1) conflicts
could not be regulated by "strict statutory rules," (2) enforcement should be flexible
with the FHLBB bearing responsibility and (3) regulations could be based on cooperation
between all banking agencies. Id. at 39.
87. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) would undoubtedly resist this change on the
ground that it would reduce the effectiveness of its monetary policies. The FRB and
the FHLBB are not barred from cooperation and consultation. The Interest Rate
Control Act requires the FHLBB to confer with the FDIC and FRB before changing
interest rates. Also the FHLBB occasionally consults with the FRB when it intends to
expand or contract advances (loans) to its member banks. M1utvr.L, supra note I, at
58. In addition, the Treasury has the power to forbid the FHLBB from issuing its
bonds and debentures. Id. at 227. To forestall the FRB's objection to this change Con-
gress could amend the Federal Home Loan Bank Act to require the FHLBB to ask
permission from the FRB Open-Market Committee before it expands advances by
some fixed standard, e.g., more than 2 per cent in one month.
88. Through the savings bank trade association, these bankers have opposed the
proposed Housing Institutions Modernization Act of 1972, S.1671, see note 2 supra,
thus demonstrating their support for retention of the mutual form. See AN~tuA. RErettr,
supra note 15, at 22.
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III. Conclusion
Beyond statutory reforms adopted by Congress, the FHLBB's fu-
ture direction will depend heavily on the backgrounds, interests and
personalities of the particular individuals on the Board. As a matter
of practical politics, the President plays a preeminent role in shaping
the FHLBB's policies through his formal powers of appointment and
through less visible modes of influence ranging from public state-
ments to private conversation. Avoidance of involvement on his part
is as important a policy as direct intervention. His involvement, if
exerted on behalf of depositors and the general public, could be an
important force for reorientation of the entire regulatory mechanism.
It may be argued that broader structural reform, designed to se-
cure the independence of the Board, will be necessary to insulate
it from political pressure and special interests. In this respect,
comparisons are often made between the FHLBB8 9 and its counter-
part, the Federal Reserve Board,90 whose members are more numerous
(seven instead of three) and whose terms are longer (fourteen years
instead of four). But this argument is undermined by the nation's
experience with regulation. Critics of regulatory agencies have cogent.
ly observed that statutory independence in no way guarantees real
independence from special interests. The records of these agencies,
including the FRB, are too checkered to justify recommending struc-
tural reform as a panacea. In the end, the critical factor may be the
President's commitment to reform.
89. MARVELL, supra note 1, at 40.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
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